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[L. A. No. 21984. In Bank. Aug. 13, 1952.] 
JACOB B. ROSE, Respondent, v.MELODY LANE OF 
WILSHIRE et aI., Defendants; PIG'N WHISTLE COR-
PORATION, Appellant. 
[1] Negligence-Care by Persons in Charge of Personal Property. 
-Owner of cocktail lounge may be held liable for injuries 
sustained by patron when the stool on which he was sitting 
collapsed, notwithstanding expert testimony that the metal 
pin which held the upper part of the stool in place broke as 
the result of a progressive fatigue fracture and that such 
defect could not be detected before the break, where the very 
fact that it is impossible to detect this type of defect made it 
all the more important that the owner install stools so de-
signed that the possibility of a break be reduced to a minimum, 
where a continued localized stress was to be anticipated in 
view of the swivel action of the seat, and where the jury 
may reasonably conclude that the pin was not large enough, 
or of a suitable design, to withstand the strain which would 
be placed on it. 
[2a,2b] Id.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Application of RuIe.-Patron of 
cocktail lounge who was injured when the stool on which he 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 129; Am.Jur., Negligence, § 301. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,9] Negligence, § 53; (2] Negligence, 
§l3S; [3, 5] Negligence, §135; [4] Negligence, § 136; [6, 7] N eg-
ligence, §l37; [8] Negligence, § 140; [10] Negligence, § 198(2); 
[ll-14] New Trial, § 15.1. 
at C.ld-l. 
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was sitting collapsed is entitled to rely on the doctrine of 
res ip~a loquitur, Rinc!l seats designed for use by patrons of 
commercial establishments do not ordinarily collapse without 
negligenc<' in their construction, maintenance or use. 
[3] ld.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Limitations of Doctrine.-Doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur applies if the accident in question would 
not ordinarily have happened in the absence of negligence 
and if defendant had exclusive control of the instrumentality 
causing the injury. 
[4a, 4b] ld. - Res Ipsa Loquitur - Control of Instrumenta.lity.-
Whl'n patron of cocktail lounge did no more than sit on a 
stool when it gave way injuring him, and his cgnduct was not 
improper in any way, the owner of such establishment had 
exclusive control of the stool within the meaning of the res 
ipsa loquitur doctrine. 
[5] Id.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Limitations of Doctrine.-When it 
has been established that the accident in question was more 
probably than not the result of negligence, to apply the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur it need only be determined that 
defendant is the sole person who could have been guilty of 
that negligence. 
[6] Id.-Res·Ipsa Loquitur-Effect of Evidence.-Inference of de-
fendant's negligence which arises when res ipsa loquitur is 
applicable is sufficient to sustain a verdict against defendant 
unless it is overcome by plaintiff's own evidence, or unless it 
it conclusively rebutted by evidence which is clear, positive, 
uncontradicted and of such a nature that it cannot rationally 
be disbelieved. 
[7a,7b] Id.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Effect of Evidence.-Inference 
of defendant's negligence which arises under doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur when stool on which plaintiff was sitting at 
defendant's bar collapsed is strengthened rather than dispelled 
by evidence that plaintiff fell immediately on sitting down, 
that after the accident the back of the chair was found 
broken, and that it is possible that a defect in the back of 
the chair was the cause of the fall and that the weakened 
metal pin, which held the upper part of the stool in place, 
broke as a result of the strain immediately placed on it. 
[8) ld.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Rebutting lnference.-Credibility of 
defendunt's expert witness and probative value of his testi-
mony to rebut inference of negligence under res ipsa loquitur 
doctrine are questions for the triers of fact.. (Disapproving 
Johnston v. Black Co., 33 Cal.App.2d 363, 91 P.2d 921.) 
[9] Id.-Ca.re by Persons in Charge of Personal Property.-In view 
of the subdued lighting in the cocktail room in which plaintiff 
[11] See Cal.Jur., New Trial, § 16; Am.Jur., New Trial, § 21. 
) 
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sustained injuries when the stool on which he was sitting 
collapsed, it cannot be said as a matter of law that an ex-
amination of the stool by defendant's employees two or three 
days before the accident was all that was reasonably required. 
[10] Id.-Instructions-Res Ipsa Loquitur.-In an action for dam-
ages for personal injuries sustained in defendant's cocktail 
lounge whl'n the stool on which plaintiff was sitting collapsed, 
where the nature of the accident and the fact that defendant 
and its agents were the only persons whose negligenee could 
have been involved gave rise to the inference that defendant 
was negligent, the jury could draw that inference without, 
as well as with, a specific instruction authorizing them to do 
so, and plaintiff could rely on that theory on appeal, even 
though no such instruction was given or requested. 
[11] New Trial-Award as to Part of Issues.-While the granting 
of a new trial limited to the issue of damages rests in the 
discretion of the trial court, an abuse of that discretion is 
shown when the record discloses that the issue of liability 
is close, the damages are inadequate, and there are other 
circumstances which indicate that the verdict was probably 
the result of a compromise of the liability issue. 
[12a-12c] Id.-Award as to Part of Issues.-In an action for 
personal injuries sustained in defendant's cocktail lounge 
when the stool on which plaintiff was sitting collapsed, an 
order granting plaintiff a new trial on the single issue of 
damages was reversed where the issue of liability was sharply 
contested; where a verdict for $1.00 general damages and 
$250 special damages was grossly inadequate in view of evi-
dence that plaintiff sustained an injury to his coccyx necessi-
tating numerous medical treatments, that the bill for medical 
services was $300, and that he incurred an expense of $52 for: 
X-rays; and w~re other circumstances, such as that the jurors ' 
returned for a rereading of testimony of a witness relating 
exclusively to the construction and maintenance of the stool, i 
indicated that the verdict was the result of a compromise. . 
[18] Id.-Award as to Part of Issues.-In determining the pro-
priety of a new trial limited to damages, uncertAinty concern-
ing defendant's liability is a controlling consideration, but it 
mAkes no difference whether that uncertainty arises in con-
ncction with defendAnt's negligence or plaintiff's contributory 
negligence. 
[14] Id.-Award as to Part of Issues.-When the jury in a per-
sonal injury case fails to compensate plaintiff for special 
damages indicated by the evidence and, despite the fact that 
his injuries have been painful, makes no award or allows 
only a trifling sum for his general damages, the only rea-
sonable conclusion is that the jurors compromised the issue 
) 
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of liability, and a new trial limited to the damages issue 
is improper; a contrary conclusion is justified only when the 
evidence of defendant's negligence is overwhelming. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from an order granting a new trial as 
to damages only. Albert F. Ross, Judge.- Reversed. 
Action for damages for personal injuries. Judgment for 
plaintiff reversed. 
Sidney A. Moss and Henry F. Walker for Appellant. 
David Schwartz and Merton L. Schwartz for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-This action was brought to recover for 
personal injuries sustained in defendant's cocktail lounge 
when the stool on which plaintiff was sitting collapsed. De-
fendant's motion for a directed verdict was denied. The 
jury returned a verdict for plaintiff for $1.00 general dam-
ages and $250 special damages. Plaintiff's motion for a new 
trial on the single issue of damages was granted. Defendant 
has appealed from the judgment and from the order grant-
ing a limited new trial. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
At about 11 p. m., plaintiff and a friend entered defend-
ant's cocktail room for a drink on their way home from a lodge 
meeting. There is no question of intoxication; the injuries 
were sustained before any liquor was consumed. Almost 
immediately upon their sitting down at the bar, and while 
his companion was giving their order to the attendant, plain-
tiff's chair separated from its supporting base and he fell 
backward to the floor, sustaining injury. 
The upper part of the stool consisted of a leather seat 
and back and was held in place on its pedestal by a metal 
pin. Defendant's expert testified that the pin broke as the 
result of a progressive fatigue fracture, which is a weaken-
ing of the metal owing to continued local stress. He stated 
that this defect could not be detected before the break, even 
with the aid of a microscope, and that such a pin might 
last indefinitely or only a short time. Defendant's main-
tenance mechanic testified that this type of seat made a par-
tial turn to right or left on a ball bearing swivel and that 
• Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Councll. 
/ 
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he removed all the seats every 30 to 60 days to lubricate 
the bearings. He had greased the seat in qnestion about 
two weeks before the accident and had found nothing wrong 
with the pin. Defendant's assistant manager testified that 
he checked the seats almost every day, that he must have 
inspected this seat not more than two or three days before 
the aceident, and that he discovered no defect. 
Defendant contends that this evidence conclusively shows 
that the accident resulted from a latent defect in the pin, 
that defendant did not know of the defect, and that reason-
able inspection to ascertain the condition of the stools had 
been made. Since defendant is not an insurer of the safety 
of its premises but is liable only for negligence in construct-
ting, maintaining, or inspecting them (BZumberg v. M. &- T. 
Inc., 34 Cal.2d 226, 229 [209 P.2d 1]; JohnstlYn v. De La 
Guerra Properties, Inc., 28 Cal2d 394, 399-400 [170 P.2d 
5] ; Perbost v. San Marino HaZZ-School, 88 CalApp.2d 796, 
802, 803 [199 P.2d 701]; McKellar v. Pendergast, 68 Cal 
App.2d 485, 489 [156 P.2d 950]), it argues that the evidence 
is insufficient to sustain the verdict. 
The jury, however, was not required to accept defendant's 
theory of the accident. There are at least two other theories 
consistent with the evidence that would support the verdict. 
[1] (1) The very fact that it is virtually impossible to 
detect this type of defect made it all the more important 
that defendant install stools so designed that the possibility 
of a break is reduced to a minimum. The expert testimony 
indicated that a progressive fatigue fracture develops grad-
ually as a result of continued localized stress and that "any 
metal is likely to start fatigue." Such stress was to be an-
ticipated in view of the swivel action of the seat; defend8nt's 
maintenance mechanic testified, as his opinion of the acci-
dent, that "when· they twisted the seat and forced it, it broke." 
. The jury may reasonably have concluded that the pin was 
not large enough, or of a suitable design, to withstand the 
strain that would be placed upon it. This view was substan-
tially that of the trial judge. In denying defendant's motion 
for a directed verdict,.he said, "I believe there is sufficient 
evidence for the jury to decide whether or not there was a 
latent defect, or whether the rod was perhaps too small to sup- ' 
port the weight ..•• " It may even have been the conclusion of 
the jury that an additional pin or other safety device was 
reasonably necessary to guard against injury. 
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[2a] (2) Plaintiff was entitled to rely upon the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur. [3] That doctrine applies if the acci-
dent in question would not ordinarily have happened in the 
absence of negligence and if defendant had exclusive control 
over the instrumentality causing the injury. (Escola v. Ooca 
Oola Bottling 00., 24 Cal.2d 453, 457 [150 P.2d 436] ; Lejeu.fIe 
v. General Petroleum Oorp., 128 Cal.App. 404, 412 (18 P.2d 
429] ; Judson v. Giant Powder 00., 107 Cal. 549, 556 [40 
P. 1020, 48 Am.St.Rep. 146, 29 L.R.A. 718] ; Scott v. London 
&; St. Katherine Docks 00., 3 H. & C. 596, 601, 159 Eng.Rep. 
665, 667.) 
[2b] Seats designed for use by patrons of commercial 
establishments do not ordinarily collapse without negligence 
in their construction, maintenance, or use. (Gross v. Fox 
Ritz Theatre Oorp., 12 Cal.App.2d 255, 256 [55 P.2d 227] ; 
Micek v. Weaver-Jackson 00., 12 Cal.App.2d 19, 21-22 [54 
P.2d 768]; Gow v. Multnomak Hotel, 191 Ore. 45 [224 P.2d 
552, 560, 228 P.2d 791J; Billroy's Oomedians v. Sweeny, 
238 Ky. 277,278 [37 S.W.2d 43] ; Sasso v. Randforce A.muse-
ment Oorp., 243 App.Div. 552 [275 N.Y.S. 891]; Fox v. 
Bronx A.nt1lsement 00., 9 Ohio App. 426, 430; cf. Du,rning v. 
Hyman, 286 Pa. 376, 379-382 [133 A. 568, 53 A.L.R. 851]. 
See, also, Gates v. Orane 00., 107 Conn. 201, 203 [139 A. 782] ; 
Bence v. Denbo, 98 Ind.App. 52, 56-57 [183 N.E. 326J.) 
[4a] Defendant and its agents were in exclusive control 
of the stool up to the time plaintiff sat upon it. I~ is true 
that in one sense plaintiff was in control of the stool while 
he was using it; at least one court has held that this circum-
stance is sufficient to prevent the application of res ipsa 
loquitur. (Kilgore v. Shepard 00., 52 R.Io 151, 154 [158 A. 
720] ; contra, Gow v. Multnomak Hotel, supra, 191 Ore. 4!l 
[224 P.2d 552, 556-560, 228 P.2d 791] ; see, also, Prosser on 
Torts, p. 298.) Such a view is artificial and ignores the pur-
pose of the requirement that defendant have exclusive control. 
[5] Once it has been established that the accident was more 
probably than not the result of negligence, it need only be 
determined that defendant is the sole person who could have 
been guilty of that negligence. (Escola v. Ooca Oola Bottling 
00., 24 Ca1.2d 453, 458 [150 P.2d 436]; Gordon v. A.ztec 
Brewing 00., 33 Ca1.2d 514, 517-518 [203 P.2d 522J ; Breiden-
back v. McOormick 00., 20 Cal.App. 184, 190 [128 P. 423].) 
[4b] Here it was the condition of the stool, not the use 
made of it, that was responsible for the fall. Plaintiff had 
done no more than sit upon it when it gave way, and there 
) 
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is 110 suggestion that his conduct was in any way improper. 
So far as construction, inspection, or maintenance of the 
stool were concerned, defendant had exclusive control. Plain-
tiff's action had no more legal significance as a cause of the 
accident than those of the innocent bystander in the typical 
res ipsa loquitur case. 
[6] When res ipsa loquitur is applicable, as it is here, 
an inference of defendant's negligence may be drawn. On 
appeal that inference is sufficient to sustain a verdict against 
defendant unless it is overcome by plaintiff's own evidence 
(see Binns v. Standen, 118 Cal.App. 625, 627-628 [5 P.2d 
637J ; Gritsck v. Pickwick Stages System, 131 Cal.App. 774, 
785 [22 P.2d 554] ; Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 
37 Cal.L.Rev. 183, 212-214; cf. Led v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 
25 Ca1.2d 605, 621-622 [155 P.2d 42, 158 A.L.R. 1008]) or 
unless it is conclusively rebutted by evidence that is "clear, 
positive, uncontradicted, and of such a nature that it can 
not rationally be disbelieved." (Blank v. OofJin, 20 Ca1.2d 
457,461 [126 P.2d 868] ; Leet v. Union Pac. R.B. 00.,25 Cal. 
2d 605, 622 [155 P.2d 42, 158 A.L.R. 1008].) [7&] The 
inference in this case was not dispelled by plaintiff's own evi-
dence. Nor did defendant's countershowing conclusively es-
tablish absence of negligence on its part. The jury may 
have rejected defendant's evidence that the accident resulted 
from a latent defect in the pin. [8] The credibility of de-
fendant's expert witness and the probative value of his testi-
mony were questions for the triers of fact. (Hutk v. Katz, 
30 Ca1.2d 605, 609 [184 P.2d 521]; Escola v. Coca Cola Bot-
tling Co., 24 Ca1.2d 453, 461 [150 P.2d 436) ; Blank v. CofJi'n, 
20 Ca1.2d 457, 461-462 r126 P.2d 868] ; Meyer v. Tobin, 214 
Cal. 135, 137 {4 P.2d 542} ; Mickener v. Hutton, 203 Cal. 604, 
609-612 [265 P. 238, 59 A.L.R. 480}; Lejeune v. Gemral 
Petroleum Corp., 128 Cal.App. 404, 416-417 [18 P.2d 429J ; 
Beinzi v. Tilyou, 252 N.Y. 97, 99-100 [169 N.E. 101].) John-
ston v. Black Co., 33 Ca1.App.2d 363, 368-369 [91 P.2d 921], 
is inconsistent with the foregoing cases and is disapproved. 
[7b] Moreover, there was evidence that after the accident 
the back of the chair was found broken; it is possible that ' 
a defect in the back of the chair was the cause of plaintiff's 
fall and that the weakened pin broke later as a result of the 
strain suddenly placed upon it. The fact that plaintiff feU 
immediately upon sitting down suggests that the chair was 
defective before he used it. In this connection the jury may 
have concluded that the inspections made by defendant's em-
I 
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ployees were insufficient to discharge defendant's duty of 
care. [9] Particularly in view of the subdued lighting in 
the cocktail room, it cannot be said as a matter of law that 
an examination of the stool two or three days before the acci-
dent was all that was reasonably required. The jury may 
even have believed that no such examination was made. 
[10] Defendant contends that, since no instruction on res 
ipsa loquitur was requested by plaintiff or given by the trial 
court, it is now too late to rely upon that theory. The doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur concerns a type of circumstantial 
evidence upon which plaintiff may rely to discharge his bur-
den of proving defendant's negligence. Such evidence was 
given to the jury in this case. The nature of the accident I 
and the fact that defendant and its agents were the only . 
persons whose negligence could have been involved give rise 
to the inference that defendant was negligent. There is no 
reason why the jury may not draw that inference without, 
as well as with, a specific instruction authorizing them to do 
so. (Fedler v. Hygelund, 106 Cal.App.2d 480,487 [235 P.2d 
247].) 
Limited New Trial 
[11] The granting of a new trial limited to the issue of 
damages appropriately rests in the discretion of the trial 
court, but an abuse of that discretion is shown when the 
record discloses that the issue of liability is close, the dam-
ages are inadequate, and there are other circumstances that 
indicate that the verdict was probably the result of a com-
promise of the liability issue. (Leipert v. Honold, ante, 
p. 462 [247 P.2d 324].) An examination of the present 
case in the light of this rule indicates that the order grant- • 
ing a limited new trial should be reversed. . 
[12a] (1) Evidence of liability. The issue of liability 
was sharply contested, for defendant made a strong show-
ing that the accident resulted from a latent defect of which . 
it had no knowledge and for which it could not reasonably 
be held responsible. [13] Plaintiff contends that the cases 
in which it has been held that a conflict on the liability issue 
is a circumstance to be considered in determining the pro-
priety of a limited new trial have all involved questions of 
contributory negligence. (See, for example, Wallace v. Miller, 
26 Cal.App.2d 55, 56 [78 P.2d 745] ; Donnatin v. Union. Hard.-
ware & Metal 00., 38 Cal.App. 8, 9 [175 P. 26, 177 P. 845].) 
That distinction, however, is not material. Uncertainty con-
cerning defendant's liability is the controlling consideration, 
Aug. 1952] ROSE v. MELODY LANE 
l311 C.2d 481; 247 P.2d 335] 
489 
and it makes no difference whether that uncertainty arises 
in connection with defendant's negligence or plaintiff's eon-
tributory negligence. 
[12b] (2) Inadequacy of damages. The evidence shows 
that plaintiff was shaken and excited at the time of his fall 
but did not feel significant discomfort until he was awakened 
during the night by pain in the lower part of his back. The 
next day he consulted a physician, and he was given treat-
ment for several months, which continued to the time of 
the trial. When he testified, plaintiff was still unable to sit 
for extended periods without pain, particularly on hard sur-
faces. For some time after the accident, he found it necessary 
to assign to an employee a number of the duties he had regu-
larly performed at his candy store. Plaintiff's physician testi- I 
fied that plaintiff had sustained an injury to his coccyx, that 
in his opinion it was a permanent injury, and that such an 
injury is painful. The bill for his medical services, cover-
ing about 75 treatments, was $300. In addition plaintiff 
incurred an expense of $52 for X rays. The verdict was for 
$1.00 general damages and $250 special damages; it was thus 
more than $100 less than the medical and X-ray charges. 
[14] When the jury fails to compensate plaintiff for the 
special damages indicated by the evidence, and despite the 
fact that his injuries have been painful, makes no award or 
allows only a trifling sum for his general damages, the only 
reasonable conclusion is that the jurors compromised the issue 
of liability, and a new trial limited to the damages issue is 
improper. (See Hughes v. Schwartz, 51 Cal.App.2d 362, 367-
368 [124 P.2d 886] ; McNe{}/1' v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 63 
Cal.App.2d 11, 16 [146 P.2d 34] ; Adams v. Hildebrand, 51 
Cal.App.2d 117, 118-119 [124 P.2d 80].) A· contrary con-
clusion is justified only when the evidence of defendant's 
negligence is "overwhelming." (See Taylor v. Pole, 16 Cal. 
2d 668, 675 [107 P.2d 614]; Orandall v. McGrath, 51 Cal. 
App.2d 438, 440-442 [124 P.2d 858].) • 
It is claimed that the inadequacy of the award is attrib-
utable to the fact that the damages issue was not argued by 
counsel. It is not likely, however, that, even without the 
aid of counsel, the jurors would have allowed less than the 
special damages shown and only $1.00 for pain and suffering. 
[120] (3) Other circumstances indicating compromise. More 
than three hours after the case was submitted to them, the 
jnrors returned for a rereading of the testimony of defendant's 
maintenance mechanic. This witness was not present at the 
) 
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accident and had no knowledge concerning plaintiff's injuries; 
his testimony related exclusively to the construction and main-
tenance of the stool. The trial was a short one, and the fact 
that the jurors were at that time still debating def('ndant's 
liability demonstrates the difficulty they were having in de-
termining whether or not defendant was negligent. In the 
light of the gross inadequacy of the award, this circumstance 
also supports the conclusion that the verdict was the result 
of a compromise. 
Defendant has appealed not only from the order granting 
a limited new trial but also from the judgment. Since its 
liability has never been properly determined, the judgment 
must be reversed. 
The judgment and order are revel·sed. Each side is to bear 
its own costs on apPE'al. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
Schauer, J., concurred in the judgment. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The views which I have expressed in my dissenting opinion 
in Leipert v. Honold, ante, p. 462 [247 P.2d 324], this 
day filed, are equally applicable to this case. 
I would, therefore, affirm the order granting a new trial 
on the issue of damages only. 
On September 11, 1952, the opmlOn and judgment were· 
modified to read as printed above. 
